University of San Diego

Digital USD
Copley Library: Faculty Scholarship

Copley Library

Winter 12-15-2001

Cross-Cultural Acceptance Of The Euro: Assessing The
Effectiveness Of Public Information Marketing
Steven W. Staninger

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/library_facpub
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons, Marketing Commons, and the Public Relations
and Advertising Commons

Cross-Cultural Acceptance Of The Euro: Assessing The Effectiveness Of Public
Information Marketing
Description, Abstract, or Artist's Statement
The introduction of the euro currency is a major social, cultural, and economic event in the history of
Europe. A massive public information marketing campaign has failed to encourage widespread
acceptance of the new currency. This paper analyzes the reasons for this failure, and suggests strategies
for future campaigns.

Keywords
Euro, currency, public information marketing, cross-cultural

Disciplines
Library and Information Science | Marketing | Public Relations and Advertising

Notes
From the Eighth Cross-Cultural Research Conference, December 12-15, 2001, Turtle Bay Resort, Kahuku,
Oahu, Hawaii.
Taken from the conference program.

Conference Program
Eighth Cross-Cultural Research Conference
December 12-15, 2001
Turtle Bay Resort
Kahuku, Oahu, Hawaii

Program Chair:
Terrence H. Witkowski, California State University, Long Beach
Proceedings Editor & Local Arrangements:
Scott M. Smith, Brigham Young University

Area Coordinators:

Julie Yu, Chinese University of Hong Kong (South/Southeast Asia)
Kim Chung-Hyun, Sogang University (North/East Asia)
Søren Askegaard, University of Southern Denmark, Odense (Europe/Middle
East/Africa)
Marcus Schmidt, Copenhagen Business School (Europe/Middle East/Africa)
Michael J. Polonsky, Victoria University (Australia/New Zealand/ Oceania)
Lenard Huff, Brigham Young University, Hawaii (North/South America)

Cross-Cutural Acceptance Of The Euro:
Assessing The Effectiveness Of Public Information Marketing
Steven W. Staninger, University of San Diego

Abstract
The introduction of the euro currency is a major social, cultural, and economic event in the
history of Europe. A massive public information marketing campaign has failed to encourage
widespread acceptance of the new currency. This paper analyzes the reasons for this failure, and
suggests strategies for future campaigns.
The economic and monetary union of Europe was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.
(European Union [EU], Chronology, 1999) From its original six members, the European Union
(EU) has grown to fifteen members, with several eastern European countries waiting for
approval of their applications. (Ibid.) Of the fifteen current members, eleven have chosen to
participate in the launching of the European Currency Unit (ECU), which, after much debate,
was named the euro in 1995. (Ungerer, 1997) The 1992 Treaty on European Union, also known
as the Maastricht Treaty, created a means by which those EU countries that met certain economic
criteria and chose to participate could abandon their national currencies and adopt the euro. (EU:
Treaty on European Union, 1992) This is an unprecedented act of political will and crosscultural homogenization. Consumers of public information in the EU were exposed to marketing
campaigns from both their home countries and the EU directorate in Brussels.
The extraordinary amount of public information to be disseminated in the eleven official
languages of the EU and among many cultures and countries represents a tremendous challenge
to the EU information office. (EU: Europa, 1999) The harmonization the methodologies of
organization and public information regimes in the participating countries is a reflection of the
degree to which each country has achieved a sense of political and social integration as
Europeans. In those countries where this process has been successful, many citizens feel
themselves to be part of the EU and citizens of Europe, not just their native country. These
countries have chosen to adopt the euro. Those countries where this process has been less
successful have - for now - opted out of the currency union.
The launching of the euro represents a profound relinquishing of economic and budgetary
sovereignty among the participating countries. The European Union has consolidated many
functions of government over the past several years, but no single event has directly affected
citizens like the impending disappearance of their national currencies and the establishment of a
common European currency. This event has forced European citizens to ask what it means to be
European, and to decide whether or not they want to be a part of a united states of Europe. To
date, Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden have chosen to reject adoption of the euro, more for
cultural and political than economic reasons.
The euro has become a manifestation of the cultural, political, and economic integration
imagined by some of the founding members of the European Community in 1957. Great Britain
did not join the Community until 1973. Denmark also joined in 1973, and Sweden not until
1995. (EU: Chronology, 1999) These three countries are not founding members and are still in

the process of evolving a eurocentric cultural identity. The launch of the euro has been largely
dependent upon the degree to which the EU has usurped national sovereignty in the realm of
information dissemination. In the eleven EU states where information integration has been
successful, the euro has been adopted either by referendum or by Parliament. Where the EU has
been less successful in distributing information about the new currency, the euro was not
adopted.
The eleven countries that have accepted the euro have had surprisingly little public debate. The
EU has had successful public information marketing campaigns in these countries. (Parguez,
1999) Citizens in Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden all maintain that they want to retain the
option to participate in the single currency and frequently discuss this possibility both in
government and in the popular press. (Nordic Business Report, 1998) Instead of seeing the
euro as integral to EU membership, “...in these countries, the EMU was a still-undecided
extension of the EU membership issue.” (Pesonen, Gilljam and Jenssen, 1998) Public
information marketers and the EU information regime have been unable to create the consensus
of opinion necessary for the adoption of the euro in these countries.
When the idea of a common currency and central bank for the EU was first proposed in 1988, it
would have been impossible to imagine the extent of the explosion of electronic information.
(Ungerer, 1997) The Internet has the tendency to standardize information, making all data
conform to a particular electronic style. The EU has struggled with consistent dissemination of
information. Each EU country has its own traditions of information organization. The degree of
internet connectivity varies widely between and within EU countries. The availability and
quality of libraries also varies widely within the EU. Economic and political integration, as
manifested by the introduction of the euro, has necessitated the development of new
methodologies of organization to deal with not only official EU documents, but basic public
information. The introduction of the euro in the participating countries is a case study of how
public information is made to conform to a central authority in a multi-lingual, multi-cultural
environment.
European monetary union is not just an economic project; it has required an extraordinary
amount of political organization and cultural integration. The tremendous financial and cultural
costs of implementing the euro were small, in the opinion of European politicians, compared to
the costs of maintaining the status quo. The euro represents an important step in the cultural
integration of Europe. One analyst notes that if the goal were merely economic, the benefits of a
common currency could be “achieved at much lower economic cost by taking the deutsche mark
as the common currency.” (Meltzer, 1997) This was politically impossible, particularly given
the historical rifts between the two major continental powers, France and Germany. Each of
these countries brings with it spheres of political, economic, and cultural influence. In his essay
on the American perspective on the euro, Allan H. Meltzer observes, “Each of the partners brings
along some junior partners. The Benelux countries and Austria are small economies in the
German orbit. They have no prospect of operating an independent central bank or conducting
monetary policy that is independent of Germany’s.” (Meltzer, 1997)
The euro is very much a German and French project. The smaller countries and economies of

the EU “have not been asked to decide whether the single currency is a good idea; only to decide
whether to join a project that would go ahead anyway. Not surprisingly, most have chosen to be
in not out.” (Economist, 1998, December 5) The euro is more a cultural than an economic event.
The eurozone is multilingual and multicultural, and reaches far beyond the member countries
into Africa and Eastern Europe. France has Spain and Italy within its spheres of influence, as
well as many African countries and other current and former French colonies which currently use
the French Franc as their currency. French Overseas departments and territories, as well as the
French Currency Area (Communaté Financière Africaine [CFA]) of central and west Africa will
also be in the euro zone. (World Currency Yearbook, 1996) There is the distinct possibility of
“euroization”, i.e., the adoption of the euro as legal tender in the developing economies of
eastern Europe. This will have a profound effect on the stability of the new currency, and “the
ECB is desperately looking for a way to stop them.” (Covill, 1999) The popularity of the euro
creates a tremendous challenge for the EU to distribute both accurate and timely information
about the new currency.
One of the primary challenges in the ongoing attempts to integrate the European states is the
variety of languages spoken within the Union. Most printed EU documents are not widely
available in all EU member languages, and are generally printed only in English and French.
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Portugal,
Luxembourg, and Finland have opted to adopt the euro as their national currency. Information
on the euro is available in eleven languages on the EU internet site, but internet availability
varies widely in the EU. (EU: Europa, 1999) The EU homepage has a great variety of vital
information about the EU and the euro, but its use assumes access to computers, internet
connectivity, and the knowledge necessary to navigate the homepage once logged on.
Information on an event of the importance of a new currency must reach all citizens, not just the
educational and technological elite. To compensate for this insufficiency of information,
virtually every bank and financial institution publishes brochures about the euro for their
customers. This is an example of one of the primary problems of a multi-cultural, multigovernmental organization like the EU. Much vital public information is distributed not by the
EU, but by private enterprises and local governments attempting to interpret EU directives for
their local constituencies. The result is often inconsistencies, errors, and misunderstandings.
The EU has the unenviable task of attempting to distribute detailed information about the euro to
a wide variety of countries; not just the eleven participating members, but trading partners who
will be affected by the introduction of a new currency. The diversity of languages within the
eurozone is one of their biggest challenges.
German is by far the most widely spoken native language in the EU, with approximately 110
million speakers in Germany, Austria, and the northeastern province of Italy. French, with 57
million speakers in France and 4 million in Belgium, is the second largest, followed by Italian
(57 million speakers), English (56 million), and Spanish (40 million). The smaller official
languages of the EU include Dutch, with 15 million speakers in the Netherlands and 6 million in
Belgium, Greek (10 million), Portugese (9.5 million), Swedish (8 million), Danish (5.2 million)
and Finnish (4.9 million). (Price, 1998) These are the eleven official languages of the EU. Not
included are languages like Gaelic, Basque, Luxembourgish, and other small languages and
dialects which are spoken by a significant number of people in Europe. An event like the euro

necessitates a clear understanding of what is to occur not just by multilingual citizens, but by
every member of society. For example, there are large numbers of ethnic Turks in living and
working in Germany, particularly in the large cities. Turkish is not one of the languages in
which EU information is distributed. Central and west African countries and countries in eastern
Europe that will - officially or unofficially - use the euro as their currency do not have official
EU publications available in their languages. Since the EU central offices in Brussels cannot
hope to achieve the necessary level of information distribution in so many different languages, it
is left to the popular press and financial institutions of the member countries to educate and
inform the public, with predictably uneven results.
Consistency, timeliness, and accuracy are vital components of public information. The EU
information regime is attempting to overcome barriers of language as well as cultural traditions
of public information distribution. The move to information integration is crucial, especially as
the intensity of political and economic integration as represented by the euro accelerates. The
EU must rely on a public/private partnership for the distribution of public information,
particularly in countries where German, French, or English are not widely spoken. The EU has
relinquished much of its control over the distribution of official information because of the
linguistic complexity of Europe.
Distribution of information on the internet and the use of English on the internet and in computer
jargon has created a new regime of public information that is technocratic and anglocentric. The
introduction of the euro has coincided with the expansion of the internet as the most efficient but not necessarily effective - means of distributing public information. The EU professes to
support a multicultural vision of a European information society. One recent report analyzing
the growth of the internet in Europe observes that “although connectivity is becoming a
precondition for economic growth in all regions, the sheer existence of the information superhighway does not guarantee development.” (Preston, 1997) Many of the more traditional
societies and cultures within the EU resist change, even though they may have access to the
latest information technology. The cultural shaping of EU public information efforts are clearly
seen with the introduction of the euro. The lines between public and private, official and
unofficial information is blurring, much like the traditional geographic borders between
European countries.
The cross-cultural message communicated by the currency itself is worth noting. There are to be
seven euro notes of differing sizes and colors. To avoid any show of political or cultural
favoritism, the designs of each note “...are symbolic of Europe’s architectural heritage. They do
not represent any existing monuments.” (EU: Coins-Notes-Sign, 1999). The eight coins also
represent a compromise of national sensitivities. Each coin has a common European face, with
the obverse being a unique national design chosen by each of the eleven participating euro states.
The result is that each euro coin will have eleven different varieties in circulation. The EU
makes it clear that “No matter which motif is on the coins they can be used anywhere inside the
11 Member States.” (Ibid.) Public information about the common currency is always presented
in a positive light, and close attention is paid to national and cultural considerations.
The EU bureaucracy is well aware of the importance of information literacy, and the challenges
posed by multiple languages. The EU has gradually attempted to shift the center for public

policy decision making from the national capitals to Brussels, the seat of most EU bureaucracies.
Nowhere is this more important than in disseminating information about the euro. Information
policy is motivated in part by the “perception that a unified approach to electronic
communications would help cement that project of increased political, economic, and sociocultural integration in the EU.” (Preston, 1997, p. 279) This policy has met with resistance.
Some countries in the EU, notably Great Britain and Denmark, have chosen to opt out of the
euro in part because of fears of increasing centralization of authority in Brussels, and concerns
about losing their cultural identity to a over-broad, eurocentric view of politics and culture.
The euro is here to stay. As the Economist reports, a “striking feature of the single-currency
arrangements is they make no provision, legal or practical, for any participant’s withdrawal or
expulsion.” (Economist, 1998, October 17) As other countries, particularly in eastern Europe,
clamor to join the EU and officially adopt the euro, accurate public information efficiently
distributed is still lacking in the EU. A cross-cultural currency must appeal to diverse national
identities, as well as political and economic realities. (Pepermans and Verleye, 1998) The
marketing of the idea of the euro to diverse European cultures has been an overlooked element of
the EUs public information campaign.
When it was introduced on January 1, 1999, the euro instantly became the world’s second largest
currency. The political and economic problems in Europe, particularly persistent high
unemployment, can be solved in part by sustained economic growth. The euro is an vital part of
this strategy. If the euro is to be adopted by those countries with pending EU membership
applications, the distribution of public information in the native languages must be considered.
The lessons learned by the rejection of the euro by Great Britian, Denmark, and Sweden can be
used as a model for establishing effective information regimes in new EU countries. Addressing
the cross-cultural issues surrounding the introduction of the euro is essential to its success. If
these countries adopt the new currency, it will mark the success of the EU’s public information
marketing campaigns, and the integration of the concept of a united European cultural identity
into the collective consciousness of these countries.
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